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I. Introduction
We're gonna cause talk and suspicion; We're gonna give an exhi-
bition. We're gonna find out what it's all about. After midnight
we're gonna let it all hang down.'
Imagine standing on a sidewalk, talking with four friends. It is
around 11 p.m. on a Saturday night. A police officer who has been
watching your group for a few seconds approaches. The officer asks
your age. You truthfully respond, "Fifteen." Immediately, the officer
places you under arrest, handcuffs you, and proceeds to conduct a
search.2
Can a person be arrested for standing in public solely on the basis
of his or her age? In the majority of American cities that have imple-
mented a juvenile curfew, the answer is yes.3 In California, juvenile
curfews have grown in popularity, but the California Supreme Court
1. ERIC CLAPrON, After Midnight, on ERIC CLAPrON (Polygram 1970).
2. These are the facts of In re Daniel W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 204 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995), review granted, 900 P.2d 600 (1995), review dismissed, 909 P.2d 328 (1996). Once a
case is accepted for review by the California Supreme Court, it cannot be cited as legal
precedent unless the court orders it republished. See CAL. Cr. R. 976(d) (West 1996).
Upon vacating its order granting review, the court explicitly refused to republish the lower
court's opinion. See In re Daniel W., 909 P.2d at 328. Accordingly, the case is used here
not as legal precedent, but as a sample fact pattern for juvenile curfews.
3. William Ruefle & Kenneth Mike Reynolds, Curfews and Delinquency in Major
American Cities, 41 CRimE & DELINQo. 347,353-54 (1995) (finding that, based upon a statis-
tical survey, juvenile curfew ordinances exist in 77% of major American cities, and that
44% of them were enacted after 1989). For example, the Bakersfield curfew ordinance
under which Daniel was arrested states:
It is unlawful for any person under the age of eighteen years to loiter upon the
streets of the city, in places of amusement or entertainment, or in other public
places within the city, between the hours of ten p.m. and five a.m., of any day
unless such person is accompanied by a parent, guardian or other adult person
having control or charge of such person under eighteen years; or unless such per-
son under the age of eighteen years has gone to a place of entertainment or
amusement other than one at which liquor is sold or served, prior to eight p.m.,
where a regular program of entertainment has commenced or been arranged for
the occasion to commence prior to eight p.m., and has held over or been contin-
ued beyond ten p.m., or such person has left such a place, a place of employment
or social call after ten p.m., and such person is thereafter returning directly to his/
her home or place of residence in a reasonable manner.
In re Daniel W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205 (quoting BAKERSFIELD, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 9.44.010 (1995)).
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has yet to rule on their legality.4 The court initially granted review of
In re Daniel W.,1 promising a definitive decision on the general consti-
tutionality of municipally imposed juvenile curfews in California.
However, the court dismissed Daniel's case five months later for fail-
ure to raise the constitutional issue at the trial court level.' As a re-
sult, Californians must continue to wait for a definitive answer on the
constitutionality of such curfew ordinances.
To date, even as juvenile curfew ordinances proliferate at the lo-
cal level, scholarly commentary on juvenile curfews in California has
been minimal. This Note addresses the continuing constitutional
problems presented by juvenile curfew ordinances, particularly in re-
lation to current California law. Part II examines the general history
of the juvenile curfew in the United States and explores the bases for
challenging such curfews under the United States Constitution. Part
III analyzes the recent growth of juvenile curfew ordinances in Cali-
fornia and the current status of applicable California law. Finally, in
light of the dismissal of In re Daniel W., Part IV proposes an alterna-
tive approach to the implementation of juvenile curfew ordinances in
California.
H. Juvenile Curfew Law in the United States
A. The Origin and Evolution of Curfews
Curfews are a mechanism of social control. Throughout history,
curfews have been enacted when powerful factions of society perceive
the imminent loss of control over less powerful citizens. Each time,
4. The constitutionality of juvenile curfews has been addressed in only two cases at
the intermediate appellate level in California and one case at the superior court appellate
level. Compare In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding a Sacra-
mento juvenile curfew ordinance to be constitutional), and People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945) (holding a Los Angeles juvenile curfew ordinance to be
constitutional), with Alves v. Justice Court, 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding a
Chico juvenile curfew ordinance to be an unlawful invasion of personal rights and liberties,
and thus unconstitutional).
California courts have also addressed the legality of arrests made on the basis of cur-
few violations without ruling on the constitutionality of the juvenile curfew ordinance. See,
e.g., In re Arthur J., 238 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the officer's
mistake regarding the hours covered by the juvenile curfew ordinance resulted in the arrest
of the minor without probable cause); In re Francis W., 117 Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 (1974)
(holding that the officer's suspicion that the juveniles were violating the curfew ordinance
was reasonable, and thus justified the initial detention); People v. Horton, 92 Cal. Rptr.
666, 668 (1971) (holding that the officer's reason for stopping a car [because it was 1:15
a.m. and there were two minors in the car] did not justify the stop).
5. 900 P.2d at 600.
6. In re Daniel W., 909 P.2d at 328.
Fall 19961
222 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:219
the members of a group lacking any substantial power and rights be-
come the scapegoats.
There are two analytical types of curfews. The distinction be-
tween them has been crucial in determining the legal ramifications of
governmentally-imposed curfews on constitutional rights. The blan-
ket or nonemergency curfew is broader in scope and breadth than the
more exacting, reactionary, emergency curfew. 7 Examples of various
emergency and nonemergency curfews are readily found in history.
The first curfew regulations have been traced to the ninth century,
when William the Conqueror used curfews to keep English citizens off
of the streets in an effort to prevent them from gathering together.'
In the United States, prior to the abolition of slavery in 1865, curfews
were used to designate times when African-Americans could be on
the streets.9 At the turn of the century, as cities experienced an un-
precedented influx of immigrants, nonemergency, blanket curfews
aimed specifically at juveniles emerged.' ° Enforcement of curfews
waned until the 1940s when the onset of World War II heightened the
country's need for a sense of control." During this period, not only
were emergency curfews imposed upon citizens of Japanese ances-
try, 2 but a perceived need to control juveniles whose parents were in
the armed services or working (often at night) in war plants also re-
7. Tona Trollinger, The Juvenile Curfew: Unconstitutional Imprisonment, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 949, 951 (1996).
8. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md. 1964).
9. See id. Katherine Hunt Federle has analogized the various restrictions placed
upon African-Americans before the Civil War to the paternalistic treatment afforded
children:
The experience of African Americans teaches us that rights must be able to chal-
lenge existing hierarchies to have value; yet the rights we accord children do little
more than insure their powerlessness. Nor may we claim that children benefit
from our paternalism, for children, like slaves, are disadvantaged by such
accounts.
Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1315,
1340-44 (1995).
10. See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 691; see also Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Con-
trol of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, 66-68 & n.5 (1958) (discussing the
development of juvenile curfews at the turn of the century resulting from society's fear that
immigrants would not control their children).
11. See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 691.
12. The United States Supreme Court held that emergency curfews directed at United
States citizens of Japanese ancestry were constitutional exercises of the emergency war
powers. See Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943) (holding that the curfew
ordinance was valid regardless of citizenship); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
91-92, 101 (1943) (holding that the executive order authorizing curfew orders as an emer-
gency war measure and requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry to abide by the curfew
was constitutional).
sulted in the re-emergence of blanket juvenile curfews.13 The enforce-
ment of curfews declined after the War, but, during the civil riots of
the late 1960s and early 1970s, emergency curfew ordinances aimed at
the general public resurged and were generally upheld as legitimate
exercises of the emergency power.
14
During this period of civil unrest in America, the approach to
juvenile delinquency took an abrupt turn away from blanket curfews.
For example, the Board of Trustees of the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency urged the repeal of juvenile curfew ordinances be-
cause curfew enforcement was found to be ineffective and discrimina-
tory.15 Blanket curfews are inherently broad in their coverage, in
contrast with emergency curfews, which are limited in application and
duration. Whereas emergency curfews have survived constitutional
attacks because they are a narrowly tailored means of addressing spe-
cific emergency situations,' 6 blanket curfews have no such redeeming
quality.17 As applied to juveniles, modern blanket curfews tend to in-
corporate exceptions in an effort to limit their intractable scope and
breadth, thereby passing constitutional muster.' 8 Because such excep-
tions in blanket juvenile curfew ordinances have not always been suc-
cessful in curing constitutional defects, 19 proponents have attempted
to reclassify them as emergency curfews.
13. See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 691.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1971) (stating that a
"nighttime curfew is an effective means of controlling or preventing imminent civil disor-
der," and thus holding that a curfew ordinance enacted during a state of emergency was
valid); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 926 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967) (holding that a curfew im-
posed during a state of emergency, in this case a riot, was constitutional); Glover v. District
of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 559, 561-62 (D.C. 1969) (holding that an emergency curfew
promulgated in response to "rioting, looting, and burning" was constitutional).
15. See Ruefle & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 347.
16. See supra notes 12, 14.
17. Trollinger, supra note 7, at 955.
18. Typical exceptions to blanket juvenile curfews include the following: accompani-
ment by a parent or other authorized adult; travel between home and place of employ-
ment, worship, or municipal or school function; emergency errands relating to the health of
a family member; remaining on the sidewalk in front of the minor's home or the home of a
neighbor. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D.D.C. 1989); Bykofsky v. Bor-
ough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp 1242, 1246-47 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d
488, 490 (5th Cir. 1993).
19. Despite the existence of stated exceptions to the application of blanket juvenile
curfews in the ordinance, courts have found curfews violative of fundamental rights, vague,
and overbroad. See, eg., Waters, 711 F. Supp. 1135-36 ("Yet it is what these curfews re-
strict, and not what they exempt that matters most."); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.
Supp. 1381, 1383 (D.N.H. 1984) ("[T]he ordinance, despite its exceptions, sweeps a broad
range of innocent behavior into the category of prohibited conduct.").
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During the last twenty years, as competing policy agendas have
emerged stressing a crime-control approach to juvenile justice,2" pro-
ponents of juvenile curfews argue that they are necessary to protect
the safety of children and the community.21 Yet, studies have found
no definitive correlation between implementation of juvenile curfews
and reduction in juvenile crime.22 Nevertheless, the public has recog-
nized a crisis in the form of serious delinquency and gang violence and
has demanded appropriate action.23 Inevitably, this recognized crisis
has resulted in the recasting of juvenile curfews as emergency, rather
than nonemergency, blanket curfews. As the increase in the number
of cities enacting juvenile curfews suggests, this crime-control ap-
proach seems to be winning adherents.24
B. The Scope of Juveniles' Constitutional Rights
Across the nation, courts have begun to realize that the anti-
quated legal fiction that childhood is a condition "continuing from the
age of birth to the age of majority, at which time the young person is
presumed to be capable of responsible adult decision making" has se-
20. See Ruefle & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 348.
21. See id. at 349. Ruefle and Reynolds explain the logic behind such curfews as
follows:
In high-crime communities, curfews are a means to protect non-delinquent youth
from crime and to deny delinquent youth the opportunity to engage in crime. In
low-crime communities, they provide the police with the means to disperse late-
night crowds of juveniles, to stop and question youths during curfew hours, and, if
necessary, to keep youths off the streets.
Id.
22. See Waters. 711 F. Supp. at 1125; see also Nell Bumstein, In by Midnight: California
Brings on a New Wave of Youth Curfews, CAL. LAw., Nov. 1994, at 25 (describing the only
scientific study to measure the effectiveness of juvenile curfews, which found that even
though fewer juveniles were arrested during curfew hours, the number of juveniles ar-
rested in the afternoon increased).
23. See Ruefle & Reynolds, supra note 3, at 361.
24. See id. at 360-61. However, attempts at reclassification of blanket juvenile curfews
as emergency curfews have ultimately failed due to the lack of factual information evidenc-
ing the "emergency" status of juvenile crime and the required breadth of juvenile curfews
necessary to effectuate reductions in such crime. Trollinger addresses this reality and con-
cludes that:
[T]he "emergency" blanket curfew law poses at the very least a constitutional
conundrum. Legitimate emergency curfews tend to be constitutional, while blan-
ket curfews can only very rarely and under the most extreme circumstances sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny. The blanket law possesses many of the determinative
elements of an emergency curfew, but is, within its operative geographical area
and personal effect, blanket in application. Thus, it can be constitutional if and
only if it possesses all or most of the characteristics that render constitutional the
narrowly confined emergency curfew while possessing few or none of the charac-
teristics that render unconstitutional the blanket law.
Trollinger, supra note 7, at 960 (footnotes omitted).
FUE
vere logical failings.25 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this
notion in a case involving a minor's right to privacy, declaring that
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitu-
tional rights."26
Furthermore, in upholding the due process rights of minors, the
Supreme Court has declared that "whatever may be their precise im-
port, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone."2 7 The Court has also stated that minors "are entitled to
a significant measure of First Amendment protection."2" In light of
the Supreme Court's recognition that the First Amendment rights of
minors include the freedoms of speech, expression, and religion,2 9 rec-
ognition of minors' rights to assemble and associate should naturally
follow.30
However, the Supreme Court has not yet held that the constitu-
tional rights of minors are coextensive with the rights of adults. In-
stead, the Court has maintained that the state has greater power to
restrict the rights of children.31 Thus, while acknowledging that "a
child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection
of the Constitution,"32 the Court has simultaneously held fast to pater-
nal authoritarianism over the conduct of juveniles.
25. ROBERT M. HOROWITZ & HOWARD A. DAVIDSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
116 (1984).
26. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). Lower courts have increasingly followed the
Supreme Court's lead, holding that minors are no less deserving of constitutional protec-
tions than are adults. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989)
("The right to walk the streets, or to meet publicly with one's friends for a noble purpose
or for no purpose at all-and to do so whenever one pleases-is an integral component of
life in a free and ordered society."); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384
(D.N.H. 1984) (finding that juveniles have a personal liberty interest in freedom of move-
ment); City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa 1992) ("It is too late in
the day to say that minors do not have constitutional rights under the federal
Constitution.").
28. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975).
29. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that minors enjoy the right of free expression); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that minors enjoy the rights of freedom of
religion and expression).
30. Arizona has found that minors have these rights. See In re Juvenile Action No.
JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599, 605 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
31. See Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews
and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (1984).
32. Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 622, 633 (1979).
JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCES
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In Bellotti v. Baird,33 the Supreme Court described three specific
reasons why children may be viewed differently from adults under the
Constitution: "the particular vulnerability of children; their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the im-
portance of the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their chil-
dren."34 Even though this measure of children's rights on the basis of
their lack of maturity, judgment, and choice has been duly criticized,35
it "continues to pervade the law and profoundly affects the social and
legal world in which children live."3 6
Proponents of juvenile curfews respond to the Court's justifica-
tions in Bellotti enthusiastically and with arguments in favor of gov-
ernment intervention in the control of juvenile conduct. Based on
propositions that curfews are an effective tool in preventing victimiza-
tion of children, imposing parental responsibility, and repairing the
deterioration of the American family, juvenile curfew proponents
staunchly support the rationale and effect of the Bellotti factors. 7
On the opposing side of the debate are arguments that curfew
laws not only epitomize the use of law as a mechanism for social con-
trol, but additionally "they are inefficacious, they burden scarce police
resources, and they unconstitutionally restrict liberty."38 Essentially,
juvenile curfews are cosmetic solutions to a much deeper problem.3 9
Opponents of juvenile curfews further argue that, conceptually, cur-
33. 433 U.S. 622 (1979).
34. Id. at 634. In Bellotti, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
statute requiring parental consent before a minor can obtain an abortion. Considering the
proposition that age does not remove a child from the sphere of constitutional protection
to be a mere departure point for the constitutional analysis, the Court recognized that "the
status of minors under the law is unique in many respects" and thus "requires that constitu-
tional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents
and children." Id at 633, 634. Therefore, although the Court determined that minors gen-
erally have the same constitutional rights as adults, the Court declared that the "State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
'concern, . . sympathy, and ... paternal attention."' Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
35. See Federle, supra note 9, at 1319-25.
36. Note, supra note 31, at 1168.
37. See Trollinger, supra note 7, at 961-62; see also Patrick Hoge, Families of 2 Slain
Boys File Claim, Blame Officer, SAcRAmENTo BEE, Mar. 29, 1994, at B1 (relating the mur-
der of two boys, ages 12 and 13, who were stopped while walking on a busy boulevard at
2:15 a.m. by a police officer and told to go home; the officer did not enforce the juvenile
curfew, and the boys' bodies were found a few hours later).
38. See Trollinger, supra note 7, at 964 (footnote omitted).
39. Raquel Moreno & Jose Pavon, Curfew Would Target Minorities, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
6, 1995, at A21 (arguing that a proposed San Francisco curfew is a mere "Band-Aid" mea-
sure and a costly "scapegoating policy" which fails to address the root causes of juvenile
crime and makes youths, particularly minorities, police targets).
fews are ineffective because they do not deter those juveniles who in-
tend to break the law, and they assume that the governmental
imposition of curfews will effectuate parental responsibility where it is
lacking.4 °
Courts have, however, applied the rationale articulated by the
Supreme Court in Bellotti, albeit inconsistently.4 ' Possibly for lack of
more specific authority or to justify a predetermined outcome, some
courts have used the Bellotti factors in curfew cases "to prove that
minors do not possess fundamental rights," thus inverting the consti-
tutional analysis.42 As a result, although one state supreme court has
stated that "[r]estricting movement ... to the extent that First Amend-
ment rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent
to denial of those rights,"43 restrictions upon, and regulations of, mi-
nors' constitutional rights have often been justified by characteristics
inherent in childhood. 44
The scope of children's rights is clearly limited. The proliferation
of blanket juvenile curfews directly evidences our society's concern
for the protection of juveniles against violent crime and the protection
of the community from juvenile crime, as well as the resurrection of
the American family and parental responsibility. Although not en-
tirely satisfactory, and certainly not a legitimate or wise basis for the
justification of juvenile curfews, many courts have relied upon the
characteristics inherent in childhood as the rationale to support gov-
ernment intervention in the innocent activity of juveniles. The easy
escape offered by such reasoning could not be more disturbing for a
40. See Trollinger, supra note 7. at 966.
41. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[A]ctivities of...
minors may be treated differently from [those of] adults."); Bykofsky v. Borough of Mid-
dletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975) ("[Minors' activities may be] constitu-
tionally regulated to a greater extent than [those] of adults."); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (finding that the First
Amendment "rights of children... can be diminished in appropriate circumstances"); City
of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (recognizing that activi-
ties and conduct of minors may be regulated to a greater extent than those of adults).
42. Trollinger, supra note 7, at 990 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted); see also infra
note 76 and accompanying text.
43. City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa 1992).
44. See Note, supra note 31, at 1168 for an analysis of the rights of minors as persons
and the justifications utilized by the courts in limiting these rights. But see Johnson v. City
of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the Bellotti factors do not
apply where "no issue of particular vulnerability of children is presented"); McCollester v.
City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984) (summarizing the Bellotti factors as
"emphasizing the special vulnerability of children," but finding them inapplicable "where
the innocent behavior of the juvenile create no risk of delinquent activity").
__.
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country presumably predicated on the equal application of constitu-
tional rights to all citizens.
C. Three Traditional Bases for Challenging Juvenile Curfews
1. The Dual Approach to Equal Protection Challenges-Rational Basis
and Strict Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that similarly situated persons be treated alike.45 Accordingly,
if a government action classifies or distinguishes between groups of
people, an equal protection inquiry will be undertaken by the court
when considering the classification.46 If the government action disad-
vantages a "suspect class"47 or infringes upon a "fundamental right, 48
the strict scrutiny test is applied.49 Conversely, if the government ac-
tion does not disadvantage a suspect class nor infringe upon any fun-
damental right, it will be subject to the less stringent rational basis
test. 0
Application of the rational basis test to a juvenile curfew ordi-
nance would require the court to determine whether the ordinance
bears a rational relationship to the purposes sought to be achieved.5'
The state need only establish a legitimate state objective to justify the
curfew, and then show that there is a rational relationship between the
ordinance and that objective.52 Additionally, legislative judgment is
traditionally accorded wide discretion-it receives "the benefit of
every conceivable circumstance which might suffice to characterize
the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious. ' 53
45. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
46. See Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988).
47. A "'suspect class" is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or regulated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
48. Fundamental rights are defined as those rights which are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see also infra notes 57-
64 and accompanying text.
49. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
50. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28, 34, 40. The third level of equal
protection review, intermediate scrutiny, is not relevant in this context as it is limited in
application to challenges of gender-based classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-98 (1976).
51. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
52. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984) (applying the rational basis test
and holding that a state statute allowing pretrial juvenile detention served a legitimate
state objective and satisfied due process requirements through its procedural protections).
53. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191.
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Therefore, it is likely that a blanket, nonemergency juvenile curfew
would easily withstand the lenient, deferential rational basis test.
The strict scrutiny test is much more demanding. The survival of
a juvenile curfew under the strict scrutiny test is dependent upon a
compelling government interest, the necessity of the curfew to uphold
that interest, and the requirement that the curfew is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest.5 4 In challenging the constitutionality of juve-
nile curfews, the minor cannot rely on the age-based classification to
trigger strict scrutiny because the Supreme Court has held that "age is
not a suspect classification.""5 However, where age discrimination im-
plicates a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny.5 6 Accord-
ingly, the application of strict scrutiny to a juvenile curfew requires
the juvenile to show that the government action infringes upon his or
her fundamental rights. In order to have a juvenile curfew ordinance
declared unconstitutional, strict scrutiny must be triggered via the fun-
damental rights inquiry because the rational basis test would not be a
challenging hurdle in this context.
The Supreme Court has found most of the rights protected by the
First Amendment 7 and the Fourteenth Amendment58 to be funda-
mental including the following: free exercise of religion;5 9 the rights
of political expression and political association; 60 freedom of associa-
tion for the advancement of economic, religious, or cultural matters;61
the right to peaceful assembly;62 freedom of movement;63 and the gen-
eral right of privacy. 64 Courts have found that juvenile curfews impli-
cate a variety of fundamental rights under both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 65 Consequently, since curfews exclusively
54. See Natalie M. Williams, Comment, Updated Guidelines for Juvenile Curfews: City
of Maquoketa v. Russell, 79 IowA L. REv. 465, 477 (1994).
55. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
56. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
57. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
60. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
61. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
62. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
63. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).
64. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
65. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
Fall 19961
230 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24:219
affect minors, they must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.66
Should the Court find that a juvenile curfew ordinance promotes
a compelling government interest, the court would next determine
whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.67
Contrarily, if the court were to find that the government interest in
the curfew was not compelling enough to justify the infringement on
the fundamental rights of the minors affected, the analysis would end
and the ordinance would be declared unconstitutional. 68 An ordi-
nance is narrowly tailored if there is a close nexus between the gov-
ernment's asserted interest and the classification created by the
ordinance.69 Thus, the curfew would be declared unconstitutional if it
was not the least restrictive means available to accomplish the stated
goals.70
The requirements of the strict scrutiny test are demanding and
"legislation subjected to strict scrutiny analysis is rarely upheld."17 1
Accordingly, it would be crucial for a minor challenging the constitu-
tionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance that the court find infringe-
ment of a fundamental right and apply the strict scrutiny test, rather
than the rational basis test. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
not been able to decide which test to apply: "[T]he Court's decisions
reflect both a persistent unwillingness to engage in traditional strict
scrutiny analysis and a continuing recognition that children's rights de-
serve considerably more protection than that offered by the rational
relation test ....
Although some courts have used the Bellotti factors73 to deter-
mine whether to apply strict scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality
66. It has also been suggested that juvenile curfews create a classification between
"law-abiding adults and law-abiding youth" which "cannot possibly withstand even mini-
mal constitutional scrutiny." Trollinger, supra note 7, at 1001.
67. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
68. See id
69. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (explaining that
this test "ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate").
70. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D.D.C. 1989) (recognizing the com-
pelling interest in curbing juvenile crime, but stating that "[r]ather than a narrowly drawn,
constitutionally sensitive response, the District has effectively chosen to deal with the prob-
lem by making thousands of this city's innocent juveniles prisoners in their own homes").
71. Sam R. Hananel, Note, Recent Development:. Qutb v. Strauss: The Fifth Circuit
Upholds a Narrowly Tailored Juvenile Curfew Ordinance, 69 TUL. L. REv. 308, 309 (1994).
72. Note, supra note 31, at 1169.
73. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
of juvenile curfews,74 the precise impact of Bellotti on the issue of ju-
venile curfews is far from clear.' Courts have taken various ap-
proaches. At least one court has used the Bellotti factors as
justification for shifting from a strict scrutiny analysis to a rational ba-
sis test based on its determination that children's rights are less impor-
tant than those of adults.76 Other courts have used the Bellotti factors
to determine whether the state interest is compelling enough to over-
ride the minors' constitutional interests.77 Finally, several courts have
determined that application of the Bellotti factors was unnecessary.7"
As the Supreme Court has yet to review a juvenile curfew case,79
this inconsistent use of the Bellotti factors by lower courts in juvenile
curfew cases will likely continue. Although the most obvious classifi-
cation used by blanket juvenile curfews, age, is not suspect under an
equal protection analysis, discrimination based upon age implicates
the infringement of fundamental rights, triggering a strict scrutiny
analysis of the juvenile curfew ordinance.
2. Procedural Due Process and the Vagueness Doctrine
Beyond the equal protection inquiry, juvenile curfews face alter-
native constitutional challenges based upon violation of protections
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. As a threshold matter, juvenile curfews must provide notice of
74. See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137 n.25 ("[Bellotti represents] the Court's only
reasoned discussion to date of the possible bases for distinguishing minors' constitutional
rights from adults ... [and] is generally cited as controlling in cases addressing the constitu-
tionality of juvenile curfew statutes.").
75. See Williams, supra note 54, at 478-80 & n.115 ("Whether the concerns recognized
in Bellotti 'should apply outside of the abortion rights context is unclear."' (quoting Peter
L. Scherr, Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New Standard, 41 WASH U.
J. URn. & CoNTEMp. L. 163, 169 (1992))); see also supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
76. See In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) (determining that a minor's funda-
mental rights of freedom of movement and travel are not co-extensive with those of adults,
and applying the rational basis test to the juvenile curfew ordinance).
77. See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137. At least one court has determined that,
based upon the Bellotti factors, the state's interest in protecting children and the family is
sufficient to survive strict scrutiny. See City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179
(Iowa 1992).
78. See, eg., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984)
(emphasizing that the Bellotti factors "do not come into play where the innocent behavior
of the juvenile creates no risk of delinquent activity"); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658
F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a Bellotti inquiry was not necessary as
"none of the three factors ... applies [sic] to overly broad restrictions").
79. The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the only two curfew
cases to come before it: Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2134 (1994); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd
without op., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
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prohibited or required activity; a curfew ordinance necessitating peo-
ple of common intelligence to guess at its meaning is void for vague-
ness. 80 Secondly, a juvenile curfew must provide for an explicit
method of enforcement; failure "to provide legally fixed standards
and adequate guidelines for police, judicial officers, triers of fact, and
others whose obligation it is to enforce, apply and administer the pe-
nal laws" offends due process.81 The notions behind the vagueness
doctrine are thus deeply rooted in the tenets of procedural due pro-
cess, requiring fair notice and specific guidance.8m
Incorporating these principles, the Supreme Court has developed
a two-part test: "the statute or ordinance must (1) give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited; and (2) provide
an explicit standard for officers enforcing it."83 Juvenile curfews
which are unclear in their meaning and indefinite in their application
may potentially result in arbitrary enforcement, thereby violating a
minor's procedural due process protections. 4 For example, a vague
juvenile curfew ordinance could permit arrests of minors for curfew
violations when they are exercising protected First Amendment
rights.85 Additionally, and perhaps even more unacceptably, the inte-
gration of warning mechanisms in juvenile curfews potentially strips
juveniles of procedural due process by leaving the decision to warn or
arrest entirely with police officers.86 Thus, where the language of a
juvenile curfew ordinance does not provide notice of the precise scope
80. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
81. Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (Md. 1978).
82. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
83. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363,366 (Iowa 1989) (citing Kolender,
461 U.S. at 357).
84. See, e.g., Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding a
juvenile curfew ordinance void for vagueness for failure to state the hour when the curfew
ends); Ashton v. Brown. 660 A.2d 447, 460 (Md. 1995) (finding the words "bona fide or-
ganization" unconstitutionally vague); K.L.J. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.) (holding the term "legitimate purpose" to be vague); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514
P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wash. 1973) (finding the words "loiter, idle, wander or play" void for
unconstitutional uncertainty); see also Federle, supra note 9, at 1358-59 (providing exam-
ples of phrases that lack the requisite clarity to meet a vagueness challenge).
85. See K.L.J., 581 So. 2d at 922 (holding that a juvenile curfew ordinance that was not
narrowly tailored and did not provide sufficient notice of what conduct it prohibited was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because it could potentially be applied in such a
way "which would infringe on the basic rights guaranteed by the United States and Florida
Constitutions").
86. See Trollinger, supra note 7, at 975-76. Warning mechanisms in juvenile curfews
function as a predicate to arrest and prosecution, but are inherently unworkable. Through
a warning mechanism in which, for example, a juvenile curfew violator is accorded three
warnings before being arrested, the officer who finds a juvenile in violation of curfew be-
comes "prosecutor, judge, and jury." Id. at 976.
of the prohibition and is therefore likely to encourage arbitrary en-
forcement, it is void for vagueness.
3. Substantive Due Process and the Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine is so closely related to the void for
vagueness doctrine that the concepts often merge. 7 While the spe-
cific language of a curfew may not be vague, if a literal application of
the curfew infringes upon fundamental rights, it is necessarily over-
broad.88 The unreasonable infringement upon a minor's First or Four-
teenth Amendment rights triggers an overbreadth analysis.
If the sweep of a juvenile curfew ordinance is greater than neces-
sary, such that a more narrowly drawn provision will accomplish the
same purpose with a less substantial effect on freedoms protected by
the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the ordinance is overbroad. 89 Upon determining that a
constitutionally protected right or liberty interest is at stake,90 the
court would apply a strict scrutiny analysis, under which the juvenile
curfew ordinance would only pass constitutional muster if the state
could show that it was narrowly drawn to further a compelling
interest. 91
Courts applying the overbreadth doctrine to juvenile curfews
have enumerated various personal liberty interests upon which juve-
nile curfew ordinances infringe.92 In addition to the possible deleteri-
ous effects of juvenile curfews on substantial due process protections
by criminalizing innocent activity,93 courts have most often found cur-
fews to be overbroad because they restrict minors' "freedom of move-
87. See Williams, supra note 54, at 472.
88. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp 1381, 1383-84 (D.N.H. 1984);
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1981).
89. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97 (1940).
90. See McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1384.
91. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1264-65 (M.D. Pa.
1975).
92. See Williams, supra note 54, at 473-75.
93. For an analysis of the possibility that juvenile curfews may infringe on juveniles'
fundamental rights through the criminalization of innocent activity, see Trollinger, supra
note 7, at 977-78. Trollinger concludes that:
Vesting in governmental instrumentalities the authority to deprive persons of
freedom to engage in innocent conduct is a frightening proposition. The Due
Process Clause should proscribe such a result. Once innocence can be the subject
of arrest and criminal prosecution, the concept of due process evaporates. Argua-
bly, therefore, the substantive component of the Due Process clause makes even
the most carefully drafted blanket law unconstitutional.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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ment. ' 94 Additionally, courts have found blanket juvenile curfews to
be restrictive of the freedoms of speech, association, peaceful assem-
bly, and religion.95
Although freedom of movement is not one of the enumerated
liberties, it has been interpreted as a fundamental right, inclusive of
walking, strolling, wandering, and loafing, all of which are "historically
part of the amenities of life as we have known them." 96 Thus, whether
classified as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause,97 or as a right incidental to First Amendment freedoms,98 any
infringement upon free movement will be found unconstitutionally
overbroad if it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.99
Although various rights and constitutional tests are implicated by
blanket juvenile curfews, the ultimate issue of the constitutionality of
juvenile curfews remains unanswered. Potentially, it may be impossi-
ble for a juvenile to successfully challenge a blanket juvenile curfew in
the evident paternalistic environment of our society and the pervasive
resignation to viewing children as less deserving and less capable of
possessing the full panoply of constitutional rights. Nonetheless, the
tools of attack are in place.
Blanket (nonemergency) juvenile curfews necessarily spurn the
rights of equal protection, substantive, and procedural due process.
On their face, blanket juvenile curfews discriminate against juveniles
based solely on age, infringing upon the fundamental rights of free-
dom of religion, expression, association, privacy, and movement. The
94. See Williams, supra note 54, at 471 & n.61.
95. See id. at 470-71.
96. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1254 ("The rights of locomotion, freedom of
movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the public streets in a way that does not
interfere with the personal liberty of others are basic values 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' protected by the due process clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.").
98. See, e.g., City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Iowa 1992) ("When-
ever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association
require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that the First
Amendment rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial
of those rights.").
99. See Williams, supra note 54, at 473. In two cases where overbreadth challenges to
juvenile curfew ordinances were unsuccessful, the ordinances had been narrowly drawn to
protect First Amendment rights (that is, exceptions were included). See Bykofsky, 401 F.
Supp. at 1258 (holding that government interest outweighed the minor's interest in free-
dom of movement in "circumstances other than those provided for in the numerous curfew
exceptions"); In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219,224 (Colo. 1989) ("[The ordinance] does not prevent
minors from exercising their [F]irst [A]mendment rights. Minors are free to attend polit-
ical meetings, religious services, or other protected activities.").
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appropriate level of review is thus strict scrutiny, requiring a substan-
tial government interest to which the curfew is the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the purported interest. Unfortunately, the
majority of courts faced with a challenge to a blanket juvenile curfew
ordinance have undertaken the constitutional analysis from the stere-
otypical, paternalistic point of view that minors are not full citizens
under the Constitution. This view of juveniles as less entitled to con-
stitutional rights than adults is based on characteristics inherent in
childhood, which in turn are inappropriately utilized in shoring up the
required element of government interest.
With this understanding, the next step is a rational basis review of
the government interest and the language of the ordinance. Whether
the initial attack is rooted in an equal protection challenge or a due
process challenge, the deference to the Legislature combined with the
leniency of the application of the rational basis test predicts disaster
for the juvenile in most situations. California, particularly, has re-
sponded to due process challenges by applying the rational basis test
in each of its cases on the issue.
m. The Current Status of Juvenile Curfew Law in California
A. The Proliferation of Juvenile Curfews in California
Although many California municipalities have had juvenile cur-
few ordinances on the books for years, until fairly recently they were
rarely if ever enforced. 100 For example, San Diego has had a juvenile
curfew ordinance since 1947, yet it went relatively unenforced until
1994.101 In fact, over a dozen California cities have passed juvenile
curfew ordinances in the last few years, including Long Beach, San
Jose, Palo Alto, and Sacramento.102 In 1995, the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors approved an ordinance banning anyone sixteen years
old or younger from public places between the hours of midnight and
5:00 a.m., unless accompanied by an adult.'0 3 This move toward im-
100. See Burnstein, supra note 22, at 25.
101. See John Wilkins, Cross, Parade Issues Among Local Caseload, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Oct. 1. 1995, at Dl.
102. See Burnstein, supra note 22, at 25.
103. See Steven A. Chin, S.F. Eyes San Jose Curfew Results, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 9,
1995, at Al. Until 1995, San Francisco's juvenile curfew languored in obscurity; it was a
relatively unknown and unenforced ordinance which prohibited youths under 14 from be-
ing on the streets between midnight and 5 a.m. See Catherine Bowman, S.F. Voters to
Decide on Stricter Youth Curfew, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1995, at A13. However, the rising
implementation of juvenile curfews throughout California and impending mayoral elec-
tions led then-Mayor Frank Jordan to bring a revised curfew ordinance before the Board of
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plementing juvenile curfews in California reflects a national trend: an
estimated fifty-three major cities across the nation have adopted juve-
nile curfew ordinances, and many others have strengthened existing
ordinances since 1990.104
The proliferation of curfew ordinances has not gone unnoticed by
the California Legislature, which has amended and reorganized the
Welfare and Institutions Code to reflect the growing utilization of cur-
fews. Under the current code, a minor who violates a local ordinance
"establishing a curfew based solely on age" is classified as a status
offender and is eligible to become a ward of the juvenile court. 05 The
Legislature has further responded to the increased popularity of cur-
fews by implementing a provision enabling cities, towns, and counties
to recoup the administrative and transportation costs associated with
enforcing juvenile curfew ordinances. 0 6 Under this provision, the
parents or legal guardian of a second-time curfew violator may be
charged for actual costs involved in the incident. 0 7
Additionally, the Code delineates the procedure to be followed
when a police officer suspects a curfew violation. First, the officer
may "temporarily detain any minor upon a reasonable suspicion based
Supervisors. The proposal expanded the existing curfew to apply to youths under 18,
changed the weeknight curfew to begin at 11 p.m., and proscribed an enforcement proce-
dure in which curfew violators would be held at a general detention center until a parent
could be reached. Id. In support of his proposal, Mayor Jordan cited the city's interest in
protecting young people and avoiding giving them a criminal record. Id. He pointed to
statistics indicating that in 1994, "three-fourths of all juvenile crime victims were between
the ages of 15 and 17" and "17-year-olds were suspects in roughly 30 percent of aggravated
assaults and other major crimes committed by juveniles ... between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m."
during that same period. Id.
The Board of Supervisors did not adopt the Mayor's proposal, but instead passed a
curfew sponsored by one of its members. Clarence Johnson, Curfew Law Expanded in
S.F.: Those Under 17 Must Be Inside by Midnight, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1995, at A13. In
response, Mayor Jordan brought his proposal before the voters; it was soundly defeated.
San Francisco Election Results, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1995, at A26. Thus, San Francisco's
current juvenile curfew ordinance as passed by the Board of Supervisors on August 7, 1995,
provides as follows: Youths under 17 are prohibited from being on the streets between
midnight and 5 a.m., unless they have parental permission; police are required to call par-
ents or guardians of curfew violators and provide translators if necessary before taking the
youth to an appropriate facility, such as a residential center close to where he or she was
discovered (youths may not be held in any "'secure or jail-like facility"'); the mayor and
the Board may modify the curfew at any time; "a nine-member oversight committee ...
will report to the board to ensure, among other things, that police officers do not abuse
their newly acquired curfew powers." Johnson, supra, at A13.
104. See Burnstein, supra note 22, at 25.
105. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(a) (West Supp. 1996).
106. See id. § 625.5(e).
107. See id.
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on articulable facts that the minor is in violation of the ordinance.' 08
The officer may then transport the minor to his or her residence.10 9
Unless the minor "has a legitimate reason based on extenuating cir-
cumstances for violating the ordinance,""' the violation will be
treated as a first violation and the minor will receive a warning
citation."'
The California juvenile court system currently utilizes curfews as
a condition of probation in the more common situation of home su-
pervision release." 2 Where it is determined that a twenty-four-hour
secure detention is not necessary, the minor may be released to his or
her parent or guardian with certain conditions." 3 Curfews that may
result in secure detention if violated are prevalent conditions." 4
Thus, as cities, towns, and counties in California have expanded utili-
zation of juvenile curfew ordinances, the Legislature has responded by
regulating curfews.
B. Existing California Case Law on the Constitutionality of Juvenile
Curfew Ordinances
The California Supreme Court has never ruled on the general
constitutionality of juvenile curfews,"' and case law addressing the
application of particular curfews is scarce, consisting of only three
cases-two cases decided at the appellate court level and one case
decided at the superior court appellate level. In each of these cases,
the court has avoided determining the general constitutionality of ju-
venile curfews by limiting its inquiry to the reasonableness of the spe-
cific ordinance before it." 6 Applying the rational basis test to the
juvenile curfew ordinance in question, two courts found the particular
108. l § 625.5(c).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id. § 625.5(d).
112. See id. § 628.1 (West 1984).
113. See td&
114. See id.
115. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 500 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945)
("[T]he defendant is not legally privileged here to attack the unconstitutional features of
the curfew legislation generally. .. ."); Alves v. Justice Court, 306 P.2d 601, 602 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957) ("[Defendant] does not question the right of the city to adopt a curfew ordi-
nance."); In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) ("[A]ppellant con-
cedes that a municipal governing body has the power to pass a curfew law. .. .")
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ordinances to be constitutional, 117 while the third court found the or-
dinance unconstitutional." 8
A review of the analytical approaches taken by these three courts
is instructional as an academic exercise in the application of the ra-
tional basis test and reveals the historically restrictive scope of
juveniles' constitutional rights in California. As one of those courts
stated:
While no legal precedent arising in this state or in the federal
courts construing so-called "Curfew" legislation relating to mi-
nors has come to our attention, it is well settled that minors con-
stitute a class founded upon a natural and intrinsic distinction
from adults; that legislation particularly applicable to them is
necessary for their proper protection and when induced by ra-
tional considerations looking to that end its validity may not be
challenged." 9
California first encountered the issue of the constitutionality of
blanket juvenile curfews in 1945. In People v. Walton,' the defend-
ant was charged with allowing his sixteen-year-old son "to be and re-
main on a named public highway between the hours of 9 p.m. and 4
a.m. the next day."'2 1 In examining the defendant's claim that the
curfew ordinance which made it a crime for a parent to allow his child
to "remain, stroll upon, use, loiter on or be on any street or public
place" past the established curfew hours of 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. was uncon-
stitutional, 2 the court limited its analysis to the regulatory effect of
the ordinance upon the parent-defendant as he lacked standing to
challenge the general constitutionality of the curfew ordinance. 23
117. See Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. at 120; Walton, 161 P.2d at 502.
118. See Alves, 306 P.2d at 605.
119. Walton, 161 P.2d at 501.
120. 161 P.2d at 498.
121. Id. at 500.
122. Id. The curfew at issue in this case was actually one component of a triad of ordi-
nances dealing with juvenile curfews. The basic ordinance prohibited:
[A]ny parent, guardian, or other person having the legal care, custody, or control
of any minor under the age of sixteen years to allow or permit such minor to
remain, stroll upon, use, loiter on or be upon any street or public place between
the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m. of the following day, unless accompanied by an
adult having care and custody of such minor, or unless the minor had in his pos-
session a permit issued by the sheriff showing the necessity of such minor to so
use such street or public place.
Id. The first amendment to the basic curfew ordinance raised the age of a minor from 16 to
18 years. The second amendment modified the prohibitions "to eliminate the inhibitions
against any of the included minors who 'strolls upon,' 'uses,' 'or is upon' any street or
public place. Acts remaining as offenses are 'who remains or loiters' upon any street, etc.,
or public place." Id.
123. See id.
Accordingly, the court initially applied a rational basis test to de-
termine the validity of the ordinance. The court recognized the estab-
lished rule that "no presumption of invalidity of the statute will
obtain; but to the contrary, every intendment will be indulged in favor
of its validity,"' 24 and examined several cases in which legislation pro-
moting health, safety, and welfare justified burdens imposed by gov-
ernment regulations. The court concluded that the ordinance was
rationally related to the government's interest in protecting minors. 25
Prior to Walton, the only case in any jurisdiction which had dealt
specifically with juvenile curfew law was an 1898 Texas case. In Ex
parte McCarver126 the court had essentially held that "a rigid restric-
tion of the right to go upon the streets was an undue invasion of the
personal liberty of the citizen."' 27 Nevertheless, the court distin-
guished Walton from McCarver because the ordinance challenged in
Walton was not restrictive of a minor's right to go upon the streets-
but merely restricted a minor from remaining or loitering on the
streets. 128 Finally, the court held that, based on the exceptions pro-
vided in the curfew ordinance and the necessity to allow the police
officer some discretion in determining whether the facts satisfied an
exception, the ordinance was not vague or overbroad in violation of
due process requirements. 129 Thus, in the first California case to ad-
dress the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew, the court ultimately
held the ordinance to be reasonably restrictive and not overbroad.
Twelve years after Walton, in Alves v. Justice Court,30 a twenty-
one-year-old adult appealed a charge that he "willfully aided and
abetted a minor to be in a public place at the hour of 11:30 p.m. in
violation of the curfew law" on the grounds that the curfew "unduly
and unreasonably interferes with personal rights," and was therefore
unconstitutional.' 3' The Alves court began its analysis with the estab-
124. Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
125. See id. at 501-12.
126. 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. 1898).
127. Walton, 161 P.2d at 502 (construing McCarver, 46 S.W. 936).
128. See id. The Walton court also stated that, since "minors constitute a class founded
upon a natural and intrinsic distinction from adults," the Legislature could enact laws ra-
tionally related to the necessary protection of minors. Walton, 161 P.2d at 501.
129. See Walton, 161 P.2d at 502-03.
130. 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
131. Id. at 602, 604. The juvenile curfew ordinance at issue in this case consisted of two
parts; the defendant was charged with violating the second part of the ordinance which
makes it unlawful to aid and abet a minor in violating the curfew. The basic curfew
prohibited:
[A]ny minor under the age of seventeen years of age to be in or on any public
street, park, square, or any public place between the hours of 10:00 o'clock P.M.
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lished rule that government may enact legislation which potentially
interferes with the liberties of its citizens to protect the general wel-
fare, health, and safety.132 However, the Alves court stated that "this
rule is always subject to the rule of reasonableness in relation to the
objects attained."'1 33 In other words, while acknowledging the legisla-
tive deference traditionally paid to municipal ordinances, the court
also recognized the limitations of such deference.
The court distinguished Walton based on the type of the curfew
involved. Whereas the ordinance in Alves essentially prohibits a juve-
nile's "presence" in a public place after curfew, the ordinance in Wal-
ton prohibited a juvenile from "remaining" or "loitering" in a public
place after curfew.13 1 More similar in scope was the curfew ordinance
in McCarver which, unlike that in Walton, contained broadly restric-
tive provisions.135 Ultimately, despite the city's interest in "better
control of juveniles during the late hours of the night,' 36 the court
determined that the blanket juvenile curfew ordinance was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad in that it would completely preclude minors from
engaging in lawful and innocent activity, and the ordinance bore no
rational relationship to the purpose of the curfew.' 37
It would be another fifteen years before the next case to address
the issue of juvenile curfews would arise in California. By 1972, when
In re Nancy C.'38 was decided, case law on juvenile curfews had devel-
oped across the nation. Additionally, unlike his predecessors in Wal-
ton and Alves, the appellant in Nancy C. was a minor charged with
violating the juvenile curfew ordinance, which implicated a potential
challenge to the constitutionality of juvenile curfews in general.' 39
However, the court in Nancy C. mechanically followed Alves and
Walton in applying the rational basis test, rather than strict scrutiny,
based on Nancy C.'s concession that the city had the power to pass the
and 5:00 o'clock A.M. of the following day, except when and where said minor is
accompanied by a parent or legal guardian having the care and custody of said
minor, or where the presence of said minor in said place or places is connected
with, and required by, some legitimate business, trade, profession or occupation
in which the minor is engaged.
Id. at 602 (quoting CHico, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 684(a) (1957)).
132. Id. at 603.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 604.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 605.
137. See id.
138. 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
139. See id. at 116.
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curfew ordinance for the purpose of protecting minors.1 40 In light of
the state interests in protecting children, preventing mischief, and pro-
moting the safety and good order of the community, as well as the
relative unimportance of juveniles' interest in being on the streets a
night, the court asked "whether the means used, as measured by the
words of the ordinance, are so broad as to be unreasonable.' 141
In analyzing the curfew statutes addressed in prior cases, the
court delineated two classifications of curfews- "presence" curfews
and "loitering" curfews. "Those proscribing 'presence' or 'being in'
particular places have been held unconstitutional,"' 42 whereas
"[t]hose interpreted as only proscribing 'loitering' or 'remaining' have
been held constitutional.' 1 43  As the juvenile curfew at issue pro-
scribed "loitering, idling, wandering, strolling, or playing,"' 44 the court
classified the ordinance as of the loitering type.145
In arriving at a conclusion of constitutionality, the court also
noted that the curfew was reasonable in scope because it only applied
to juveniles and age is not a suspect class, 46 and the ordinance had
"reasonable and comprehensible exceptions."' 47 Thus, applying the
rational relation test, the court found the blanket juvenile curfew ordi-
nance to be a constitutional restriction on juveniles' rights.
140. See id. at 118.
141. Id. at 119.
142. 1L (citing Alves, 306 P.2d 601, and McCarver, 46 S.W. 936).
143. Id (citing Walton, 161 P.2d 498, and Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688
(Md. 1964)).
144. Id. at 120. The curfew in question provided as follows:
It is unlawful for any minor under the age of eighteen to loiter, idle, wander, stroll
or play in or upon the public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds,
or other public grounds, public places and public buildings, places of amusement
and eating places, vacant lots or any unsupervised place between the hours of ten
p.m. and daylight immediately following; provided, however, that the provisions
of this section do not apply when the minor is accompanied by his or her parents,
guardian or other adult person having the care and custody of the minor, or when
the minor is upon an emergency errand directed by his or her parent or guardian
or other adult person having the care and custody of the minor or when the minor
is returning directly home from a meeting, entertainment, recreational activity or
dance.
Id. at 117 (quoting SACRAMENTO, CAL., ORDINANCE 355, § 1 (1949)).
145. Id. at 120. The court noted that although the curfew ordinance in this case was
broader than the loitering ordinance in Walton, it still qualified as a loitering type curfew
ordinance "because the words taken together and used in their ordinary sense prohibit
tarrying and remaining in place and not merely being present." Id.
146. See id. "[I]t has been specifically held that curfew regulation of minors is [a] rea-
sonable classification." Id.
147. lId
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California case law on juvenile curfews thus consists of three
cases spanning a period of twenty-seven years, none of which have
been decided in the last two decades. Of the three cases, each has
narrowed its review to the specific determination of the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance at issue, rather than broaching the decisive ques-
tion of the constitutionality of juvenile curfews in general.
Furthermore, the courts have avoided considering the due process im-
plications clearly created by blanket juvenile curfews. By steering
clear of any potential analysis of the infringement of fundamental
rights implicit in juvenile curfews, the courts have avoided applying
the decidedly more stringent strict scrutiny analysis in any of the three
cases. Instead the courts have married their juvenile curfew analysis
to the rational basis test, and focused on the type of curfew involved
and the exceptions made. These relatively minor requirements for
what will constitute an acceptable juvenile curfew in California have
enabled a lack of stringent compliance with the constitutional rights of
juveniles. Because this limitation on the scope of juvenile rights has
added to the deluge of curfews recently passed throughout the state,
California courts will inevitably be faced with the question of the gen-
eral constitutionality of blanket juvenile curfews.
IV.- The Best Direction for California Law:
A Modest Proposal
No California court has ruled on the constitutionality of a munici-
pally imposed juvenile curfew ordinance for twenty-five years.148 In
1995, the California Supreme Court granted review of In re Daniel W.
and it appeared that the court was prepared to break its silence with a
definitive statement on the status of juvenile curfews in California. 49
Regrettably, the eagerly awaited decision was thwarted by a technical-
ity, the case was dismissed, and the appellate court opinion was or-
dered depublished °50 When the court finally does address the general
constitutionality of municipally imposed juvenile curfews, it will be
approaching the issue with a relatively clean slate. California case law
consists exclusively of three cases which are not binding upon the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court. The decisions of other state supreme courts
and federal courts are merely persuasive authority, and the United
States Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the general consti-
148. A later case, In re Frank 0., 247 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), was ordered
depublished by the California Supreme Court in 1988.
149. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 2.
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tutionality of blanket juvenile curfews. Thus, the status of current law
has placed California in an enviable and exciting position.
With the opportunity to survey the constitutional landscape
before ruling on the general constitutionality of juvenile curfews,
unencumbered by precedent and in light of current commentary on
children's fights and statistics on the effectiveness of curfews in con-
trolling juvenile crime, California can potentially shape modem legal
thought and application of the scope of juveniles' rights under the
Constitution. The history of curfews and the current eclectic approach
to juvenile curfews in the United States suggest that many state courts
have been awaiting direction from the Supreme Court; unfortunately,
no solution appears to be on the horizon. In the interim, however,
California need not be resigned to conducting business as usual, but
can endeavor to address the competing concerns on both sides of the
juvenile curfew debate. The key lies in looking beyond the municipal-
ities to the juvenile court system.
A. Goals
It is possible to impose juvenile curfews while recognizing the
rights of minors without disregarding characteristics that distinguish
youth from adults. As a threshold issue, municipalities that impose
juvenile curfew ordinances must recognize that competing interests
are at stake. On the one hand, there is a compelling need to provide
guidance for children, to protect them from criminal victimization,
and to induce them not to engage in criminal activity.151 On the other
hand, children who are constantly berated for their youth and treated
as second-class citizens are not likely to experience an epiphany on
their eighteenth birthday that this unequal treatment was for their
own good.152 The goal, then, is to strike an acceptable balance be-
151. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. See also Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d
488, 492 (1993) (recognizing the government interest in "reduc[ing] juvenile crime and
victimization, while promoting juvenile safety and well-being").
152. Tona Trollinger argues that juvenile curfews are constitutionally intolerable in-
fringements on procedural and substantive due process that give officers wide authority to
stop and question all youths appearing in public places at night. See Trollinger, supra note
7, at 950-51. Trollinger argues that curfews are ineffective to accomplish their stated pur-
pose and problematic in the way they treat youth:
That a curfew will deter criminal activity when extant criminal laws with penalties
considerably more severe are ineffective is a strong assumption .... The curfew
strikes an exacting blow on law-abiding youths. It addresses a crime problem as if
it were a youth problem. It presumes youths to be guilty and conveniently ig-
nores the voices of the disenfranchised. It penalizes juveniles less for their action
than for their status, and alienates them from police.
l at 965-66 (citations omitted).
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tween providing guidance to minors and limiting the extent of socially
detrimental, and arguably unconstitutional, government intrusion.
B. Method
Relocating the point of implementation of juvenile curfews from
municipalities to the juvenile court system is a workable alternative
that will insure that juvenile curfews meet the goals of providing gui-
dance, protecting minors, and preventing crime, while at the same
time limiting the extent of government intrusion. Currently, the Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code extends jurisdiction of the juve-
nile courts to curfew violators. 153 The Code also allows for imposition
of curfews as a condition of release and probation. 54 Finally, the
Code provides a means of financing the enforcement of juvenile cur-
fews.' 55  Thus, the structure necessary to implement curfews as
mandatory conditions of probation through the juvenile court system
is already in place.
Incorporating a curfew as a condition to probation would end the
necessity for municipally imposed juvenile curfews, thus relieving cit-
ies, towns, and counties of the burden of creating sufficiently clear,
reasonable, narrowly tailored ordinances. 56  Through this method,
lawmakers can construct an equitable balance between the goals of
juvenile curfews and the constitutional rights of minors by restricting
the application of curfews to cover only those juveniles who have
demonstrated a propensity to violate the law.' 7 Juveniles who have
not violated the law would thus maintain full constitutional protection
153. "Any person under the age of 18 years ... when he or she violated any ordinance
of any city or county of this state establishing a curfew based solely on age is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court."
CAL. WEtF. & INST. CODE § 601(a) (West Supp. 1996).
154. "As a condition for such release, the probation officer shall requird the minor to
sign a written promise that he understands and will observe the specific conditions of home
supervision release. Such conditions may include curfew.. . ." ld. § 628.1 (West 1984).
155. See id. § 625.5(e) (West Supp. 1996).
156. An example of a statute mandating curfew as a condition of probation can be
found in Florida where a curfew is authorized "as a penalty component of community
control." FLA. STAT. chs. 39.053-.054 (1996). Accordingly, as the Florida Supreme Court
recently held, "a condition of probation which is statutorily authorized or mandated...
may be imposed and included in a written order of probation even if not orally pronounced
at sentencing." State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. 1996). The court affirmed this
holding in a recent case where neither the condition of a curfew nor the time was orally
announced at the juvenile's hearing. A.B.C. v. Florida, No. 88, 182, 1996 Fla. LEXIS 1878,
at *1, *4 (Fla. Nov. 7, 1996).
157. See LAWRENCE D. HOULGATE, Ti CHILD AND THE STATE 109-10 (1980) (sug-
gesting that once juvenile offenders have manifested an inability to conduct themselves in
public, the juvenile court could impose a curfew).
from blanket curfews.'58 Removing the use of juvenile curfews from
the local level to' the juvenile court system would also effectively sat-
isfy the government interest in protecting minors, society's interests in
preventing crime and mischief, and minors' interests in complete pos-
session of the entire scope of rights guaranteed under the
constitution. 59
V. Conclusion
Determining the constitutionality of juvenile curfews involves a
continuing debate regarding the status of minors under the Constitu-
tion. Many have argued that minors' constitutional rights may be re-
stricted because of their immaturity and inherent incapacity to protect
themselves and use good judgment. Others stress that any differences
between minors and adults cannot mean that minors are entitled to
lesser constitutional rights.
It is evident that courts across the country are searching for gui-
dance on the general constitutionality of municipally imposed juvenile
curfews. Many courts have chosen to implement any rationale re-
motely applicable to juvenile curfews. While not all recent cases have
used the Bellotti factors to justify restricting minors' constitutional
rights, many courts have done so in order to avoid a strict scrutiny
analysis. Other courts have avoided ruling on the scope of juveniles'
constitutional rights by failing to acknowledge the infringement of a
fundamental right or to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, choosing in-
158. Logically, a general juvenile curfew intended to prevent crime will have little effect
on juveniles who intend to break the law-the threat of spending a night in a detention
center is far inferior to the possible consequences of committing a crime. Thus, a juvenile
curfew will only have meaning when applied to those already inclined to obey the law. See
Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989).
159. For a discussion of the potential problems with enforcement of such a curfew con-
dition, see In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 529 (Cal. 1994) (holding that a minor who was
subject to a condition of probation requiring him to submit to warrantless searches by any
law enforcement officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and that officer's lack of
knowledge of the minor's search condition was therefore irrelevant). See also Kristin
Anne Joyce, Comment, Fourth Amendment Protections for the Juvenile Probationer After
In re lyrell J., 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 865, 898 (1996) (arguing that the admission of
evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a probationer under a search condition is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment); Shelley Davis, Note, In re Tyrell J.: Children
and Their Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 391, 414
(1995) (arguing that the California Supreme Court's removal of the requirement that the
officer have prior knowledge of the minor's probationary search condition before con-
ducting a warrantless search strays from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, broadens the
requirement of reasonable belief, and contravenes the purpose of rehabilitation through
the juvenile justice system).
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stead to apply rational basis review to a challenge of overbreadth or
vagueness. California courts have taken the latter approach.
Although these holdings potentially aid municipalities in crafting
curfews which are rationally related to the government's purpose, the
appropriateness of the government purpose and the infringement on
fundamental constitutional rights have not been addressed. However,
as juvenile curfews grow in popularity, and imposition across the state
and across the nation increases, California courts are bound to be
presented once again with the opportunity to define the status of juve-
nile curfew law.
Meanwhile, a potential solution for California municipalities
seeking to enact juvenile curfews is available. By imposing curfews as
a condition of probation through the Welfare and Institutions Code,
the competing interests of the courts, the public, parents, and minors
can be effectively addressed. Curfew conditions would ameliorate so-
cietal concerns regarding protection of minors and reduction of juve-
nile crime while also preserving the full constitutional rights of minors
who have not violated the law. Juvenile curfews structured by the
California Legislature, implemented by the juvenile courts, and en-
forced by police officers in a conscientious manner would alleviate the
burden on California municipalities, which must now guess at the con-
stitutional requirements in drafting such ordinances. Although impos-
ing a curfew condition on probationers does not answer the question
of the general constitutionality of juvenile curfews, it may provide the
most practical solution among the plethora of competing interests.
